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Supplemental Experimental Procedures 
 
Experimental Task Design 
Trials were randomly drawn from lists of 60 gain, 30 mixed, and 60 loss trials. The gain trial list consisted of 4 
certain amounts {30, 35, 45, 55} with gamble gain amounts determined by 15 multipliers on the certain amount to 
accommodate a wide range of risk sensitivity {1.64, 1.7, 1.76, 1.82, 1.88, 1.94, 2, 2.06, 2.12, 2.18, 2.26, 2.4, 2.7, 
3.2, 4}. The mixed trial list consisted of 3 gamble gain amounts {40, 55, 75} and gamble loss amounts determined 
by 10 multipliers on the gain amount to accommodate a wide range of loss sensitivity {0.2, 0.34, 0.5, 0.64, 0.77, 
0.89, 1, 1.1, 1.35, 2}. The loss trial list consisted of 4 certain amounts {-30, -35, -45, -55} and gamble loss amounts 
determined by the same 15 multipliers as gain trials. The maximum gain or loss possible from a single trial was 220 
points, and participants started the game with an endowment of 500 points. Participants were presented with the 
question ‘How happy are you right now?’ after every 2-3 trials. Participants indicated their responses on a rating line 
and pressed a button labeled ‘continue’ to proceed to the next trial. Participants were informed of their current 
earnings during all choice trials. Each play started and ended with a happiness question.  
An analysis of happiness responses during the task has been reported previously [S1]. Consistent with previous 
research [S2], we found that life satisfaction measures (collected when participants first downloaded the app) 
increased with age (r = 0.083, p < 0.001), rising from 6.5 to 7.2 on average (0-10 scale) from the youngest to the 
oldest group. We found similarly that average happiness during the task (12 ratings) increased with age (r = 0.113, 
p < 0.001), rising from 55 to 61 on average (0-100 scale) from the youngest to the oldest group. Variability in 
happiness ratings decreased with age (r = -0.089, p < 0.001), from a standard deviation of 15.4 to 13.6 from the 
youngest to the oldest group. 
Choice consistency in decision tasks can be quantified as the frequency with which participants make the same 
choice of the safe or risky option when presented with the same options in two trials [S3]. Due to the small number 
of trials per play, such a metric could not be computed. We instead computed a closely related consistency measure 
by sorting trials for each trial type according to option value and determining the consistency of choices for adjacent 
trial pairs in the sorted data. 
 
Computational Modeling 
We fitted choice behavior in each individual participant with an approach-avoidance decision model that allowed for 
value-independent tendencies to choose gambles [S3]. This model accounts for the effects of boosting dopamine 
with L-DOPA on decision making [S3]. This model also includes the parameters for risk and loss aversion in 
common parametric decision models [S4-S7] based on prospect theory [S8]. As in those models, subjective values 
or expected utilities of options were determined using the following equations: 
 
𝑈𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 0.5(𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛)
𝛼𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 − 0.5𝜆(−𝑉𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠)
𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 
𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 = (𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)
𝛼𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛     𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0 
𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 = −𝜆(−𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)
𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠     𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 < 0 
 
where Vgain and Vloss are the potential gain and loss from a gamble, respectively, and Vcertain is the certain option 
value. The degree of curvature in the utility function in the gain domain is determined by gain and thus the degree of 
risk aversion for potential reward. An individual that is risk-neutral in gain trials has gain = 1, and would be 
indifferent between a certain gain and a gain gamble with the same expected value. A risk-seeking individual would 
have gain > 1 and a risk-averse individual would have gain < 1. Degree of risk aversion for losses is determined by 
loss. An individual with loss < 1 would be risk seeking in loss trials and if loss > 1 would be risk averse in loss 
trials. The parameter  determines the degree of loss aversion. A gain-loss neutral individual would have  = 1 and a 
loss-averse individual would have  > 1. 
  
  
Choice probabilities in established models [S5, S6] are often determined by the softmax rule: 
 
𝑃𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝜇(𝑈𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒−𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)
 
 
where the inverse temperature parameter  quantifies the degree of choice stochasticity. The softmax rule maps 
subjective value differences to probabilities from (0, 1). In our approach-avoidance decision model [S3], we 
modified the softmax rule to permit choice probabilities that differ from 0 or 1 in the limit. This allows for value-
independent effects on choice behavior that might account for Pavlovian influences. Computation of option 
subjective values was unaffected. We allowed for separate parameters for gain trials and loss trials. For gain trials, 
the probability of gambling was determined by gain:  
 
𝑃𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =
(1 − 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛)
1 + 𝑒−𝜇(𝑈𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒−𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)
+ 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛    𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0 
𝑃𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =
(1 + 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛)
1 + 𝑒−𝜇(𝑈𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒−𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)
    𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 < 0 
 
For loss trials, the probability of gambling was determined in a similar manner by loss: 
 
𝑃𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =
(1 − 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠)
1 + 𝑒−𝜇(𝑈𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒−𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)
+ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠    𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0 
𝑃𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =
(1 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠)
1 + 𝑒−𝜇(𝑈𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒−𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)
    𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 < 0 
 
If either  parameter is positive, the function maps choice probabilities in that domain from (, 1). If either  
parameter is negative, the function maps choice probabilities in that domain from (0, 1+). The parameter  acts as a 
value-independent (but valence-dependent) influence on the probability of gambling. 
Model parameters were fit by the method of maximum likelihood for data from individual participants. 
Economic preference parameters were constrained to the range of values that could be estimated based on the design 
matrix (: 0.5-5, gain: 0.3-1.3, loss: 0.3-1.3). We used Bayesian model comparison techniques [S9, S10] to compare 
fits for the economic decision model and for the approach-avoidance decision model. For each participant, we 
computed the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which penalizes for parameter number, and then summed BIC 
across participants. The model with the lowest BIC is the preferred model. 
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